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ABSTRACT
We present a Network Address Translator (NAT) written in C and
proven to be semantically correct according to RFC 3022, as well
as crash-free and memory-safe. There exists a lot of recent work
on network verification, but it mostly assumes models of network
functions and proves properties specific to network configuration,
such as reachability and absence of loops. Our proof applies directly
to the C code of a network function, and it demonstrates the absence
of implementation bugs. Prior work argued that this is not feasible
(i.e., that verifying a real, stateful network function written in C
does not scale) but we demonstrate otherwise: NAT is one of the
most popular network functions and maintains per-flow state that
needs to be properly updated and expired, which is a typical source
of verification challenges. We tackle the scalability challenge with a
new combination of symbolic execution and proof checking using
separation logic; this combinationmatcheswell the typical structure
of a network function. We then demonstrate that formally proven
correctness in this case does not come at the cost of performance.
The NAT code, proof toolchain, and proofs are available at [58].
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1 INTRODUCTION
This work is about designing and implementing software network
functions (NFs) that are proven to be secure and correct. Software
NFs have always been popular in low-rate environments, such as
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home gateways or wireless access points. More recently, they have
also appeared in experimental IP routers [20] and industrial mid-
dleboxes [8] that support multi-Gbps line rates. Moreover, we are
witnessing a push for virtual network functions that can be de-
ployed on general-purpose platforms on demand, much like virtual
machines are being deployed in clouds.
There exists a lot of prior work on network verification, but,
to the best of our knowledge, none that reasons about both the
security and semantic correctness of NF implementations. Most
of that work relies on models of NFs that are different from their
implementations, hence it cannot reason about the latter (although
we should note that NF models can be very effective in reasoning
about network configuration [24, 25, 30–32, 38, 39, 46, 52, 55, 59]).
One exception is Dobrescu et al. [19], which introduced the notion
of software data-plane verification, and which proves low-level
properties for NF implementations written in Click (i.e., C++) [35].
That work, however, cannot prove semantic correctness of stateful
NFs, because it does not reason about state. For instance, even
though Dobrescu et al. prove crash-freedom and bounded execution
for a specific NAT implementation, they cannot prove that it is
semantically correct, due to not having a way to reason about the
content of the flow table (e.g., whether entries are added or expired
correctly).
Our contribution is a NAT function, written in C and using the
DPDK packet-processing library [21], which we prove to implement
the semantics specified in RFC 3022 [53] and to be crash-free and
memory-safe. We chose this particular NF because it is arguably
one of the most popular ones, yet it has proven hard to get right
over time: the NAT on various Cisco devices can be crashed [17] or
hung [15] using carefully crafted inputs; similar problems exist in
Juniper’s NAT [16], the NAT in Windows Server [40], and NATs
based on NetFilter [18]. Moreover, like many NFs, NATs maintain
per-flow state that needs to be properly updated and expired, which
is a typical source of verification challenges.
We implemented our NAT in C, because this is the language
typically used for high-performance packet processing, and it ben-
efits from a rich and stable ecosystem that includes DPDK. Given
that we anyway wrote our NAT from scratch—and our approach,
in general, requires refactoring—we did consider using a more
verification-friendly language. In the end, however, we considered
that NF developers are more likely to adopt our toolset if it allows
them to code in a familiar language and leverage existing expertise
and tools, even if they have to follow extra constraints (such as
using a specific library of data structures) and annotate their code.
Recent work argues that verifying the C implementation of a real,
stateful NF is infeasible with symbolic execution [55], but we show
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that it can be done if symbolic execution is combined with other
verification techniques.
The rationale behind our approach is that different verification
techniques are best suited for different types of code. The beauty of
symbolic execution [9] lies in its ease of use: it enables automatic
code analysis, hence can be used by developers without verification
expertise. The challenge with symbolic execution is its notorious
lack of scalability: applying it to real C code typically leads to path
explosion [19, 55]. The part of real NF code that typically leads to
unmanageable path explosion is the one that manipulates state.
Hence, we split NF code into two parts: (1) A library of data
structures that keep all the “difficult” state, which we then formally
prove to be correct—this takes time and formal methods expertise,
but can be amortized if the library is re-used across multiple NFs;
and (2) stateless code that uses the library, which we automatically
and quickly verify using symbolic execution. The challenge lies in
combining the results of these two verification techniques, and for
that we developed a technique we call “lazy proofs”. A lazy proof
consists of sub-proofs structured in a way that top-level proofs
proceed assuming lower level properties, and the latter are proven
lazily a posteriori. For example, symbolic execution requires the use
of models that must be correct; we first do the symbolic execution
and only afterward validate automatically the correctness of the
models. This approach enables us to avoid having to prove that our
models are universally valid—which is hard—but instead only prove
that they are valid for the specific NF and the specific properties
we verified earlier with symbolic execution. This is much easier.
We show that formally verifying the correctness of our NAT does
not come at the price of performance: compared to an unverified
NAT written on top of DPDK, our verified NAT offers similar la-
tency and less than 10% throughput penalty. Any DPDK-based NAT
we experimented with, verified or not, significantly outperformed
NetFilter, the popular Linux built-in NAT.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: after providing
background (§2), we illustrate our approach with a simple exam-
ple (§3), state formally what we proved about our NAT (§4), describe
our verification process (§5), and report on our experimental evalua-
tion (§6). Then we discuss limitations and future work (§7), present
related work (§8), and conclude (§9).
2 BACKGROUND
Our work falls in the general area of “data-plane verification.” This
term is typically used to denote two different types of approaches:
One category of work treats as one big data plane the combination
of the configured data planes of network devices in a network,
and reasons about network properties (reachability, loops, etc.)—
we refer to this as “network verification.” An orthogonal category
reasons about properties of the data-plane software running on
individual devices, and reasons about software properties (crash
freedom, bounded execution time, memory safety, etc.)—we refer
to this as “NF verification.” In network verification, the goal is to
demonstrate that a particular property (e.g., that a packet with
certain header features will always reach a given destination) holds
in a specific network with particular NFs configured and connected
in a particular way. In NF verification, the goal is to prove that
a particular property (e.g., there exists no input packet that can
trigger a buffer overflow in the NF) holds for all networks and
workloads, i.e., regardless of how the NF is configured or connected.
There is a rich body of work on network verification [24, 25, 30–
32, 38, 39, 46, 52, 55, 59]. In contrast, there is much less work on NF
verification [19].
The success of network verification depends on the success of
NF verification: Network verification relies on models of the NFs
that compose the network, whether these models are informally
captured in an RFC or more formally in a SEFL model [55], NICE
model [10], etc. However, a model-based proof that a packet will
always reach a destination is trivially invalidated by an implemen-
tation bug in a middlebox that causes that packet to be dropped, in
violation of the model. There are ways of testing whether such a
model is faithful to a given implementation [55], but there is a big
gap between testing and verification: a successfully tested model
can still exhibit behaviors that do not occur in the implementation,
and vice versa. NF verification can, however, ensure that an NF
implementation deployed in the real network is indeed faithful to
the model used for verifying the network.
Our work belongs to the category of NF verification and aims
to improve the state of the art on two fronts: (1) verify high-level
semantic properties, such as the correct implementation of an RFC,
and (2) verify NFs that are stateful. Dobrescu et al. [19] did verify a
stateful NAT, but proved only low-level properties (crash freedom
and bounded execution), therefore not encountering some of the
harder challenges of stateful NFs. We aim to resolve these chal-
lenges, while not placing on operators the burden of writing or
adapting models, and at the same time keeping the NF implemen-
tations’ performance in the same ballpark as that of non-verified
NFs. In this paper we report on our first step in this effort: the
development of a stateful, well-performing NF, which we prove to
implement the NAT semantics as understood from RFC 3022, in
addition to being free of crashes, memory bugs, leaks, and other
low-level properties.
3 THE VIGOR APPROACH
To verify our NAT, we developed a verification toolchain that we
call Vigor, which includes a library of verified data structures, called
libVig. We envision the software development process with Vigor
to revolve around three distinct developer roles with a clear sep-
aration of concerns: libVig developers, standards developers who
write contracts in formal logic to specify public standards, and NF
developers who implement these standards with verified NFs. The
first two roles require expertise in software verification and formal
methods, but their time and effort investment can be amortized
across the many NFs that share common components and imple-
ment the same standards in different ways. Developers in the latter
role, however, should need little to no expertise in verification. It
is they who are the true beneficiaries of Vigor, as they can now
write code that they prove correct with relative ease. In this paper,
the authors took on all three roles, but we envision that eventually
the roles could be taken on by different specialized teams or even
different organizations.
We illustrate the use and functioning of Vigor with a trivially
simple NF that implements the discard protocol [48]: an infinite
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loop receives packets from one interface, discards the ones sent to
port 9, and forwards the rest through another interface.
Code. The NF developer does two extra things relative to writing
standard code: she annotates loops and encapsulates state in libVig
data structures that Vigor can reason about. Fig. 1 shows our verified
implementation. It includes an annotated event loop (VIGOR_LOOP
on l.6) and a ring buffer (r on l.4) for absorbing bursts, which is
accessed through four calls (ll.9, 11, 12, 13). Network interaction
happens via three functions: receive (l.10) non-blockingly reads
an inbound packet and stores it in the output argument, returning
success or failure; can_send (l.12) checks if a new packet can be
sent; and send (l.14) sends the packet pointed to by its argument.
1#define CAP 512
2int main() {
3 struct packet p;
4 struct ring *r = ring_create(CAP);
5 if (!r) return 1;
6 while(VIGOR_LOOP(1))
7 {
8 loop_iteration_begin(&r);
9 if (!ring_full(r))
10 if (receive(&p) && p.port != 9)
11 ring_push_back(r, &p);
12 if (!ring_empty(r) && can_send()) {
13 ring_pop_front(r, &p);
14 send(&p);
15 }
16 loop_iteration_end(&r);
17 }
18 return 0;
19}
Figure 1: Verified implementation of the discard protocol.
Loop invariants. Our verification process requires loop invari-
ants to reason about the effect of loops. Currently, the NF developer
writes these invariants manually, in formal logic (Fig. 2, ll.1-5) and
in C (ll.7-9). In future work, we hope to be able to extract them
automatically from the code using existing techniques [23, 47], or
at least to automatically help the NF developer formulate them.
1/*@
2 fixpoint bool packet_constraints_fp(packet p) {
3 switch(p) { case packet(port): return port != 9; }
4 }
5 @*/
6
7static bool packet_constraints(struct packet* p) {
8 return p->port != 9;
9}
Figure 2: An invariant preserved by the loop in Fig. 1 is that
∀packet p ∈ rinд r ,packet_constraints(p) == true.
Target properties. Vigor proves that this NF never crashes (an
example of a low-level property) and that it never yields a packet
with target port 9 (an example of a semantic property). For the
latter, the gist of the proof is to show that the code never pushes
onto the ring packets with target port 9, and that the ring never
alters the stored packets; these two properties imply that a popped
packet can never have target port 9. There are three steps:
Step 1: Function contracts & proofs. For each method of a
libVig data type1, the libVig developer writes a contract, i.e., a
formal specification of what the method guarantees; she also writes
a formal proof that the implementation of that method satisfies the
contract. This is a significant undertaking, but can be amortized
across the potentially many NFs that will use the same data type.
Fig. 3 shows the contract (ll.2-6) and the implementation of the
ring_pop_front function, which removes the packet at the front of
the ring2. The contract says that this function will not damage the
ring, will remove the packet at the front of the ring, and will honor
certain constraints that hold for all packets in the ring (l.6), as long as
the ringwas in a good state and honored these constraints before the
function was called (l.2). In the contract, packet_constraints_fp is
an abstract function, i.e., the contract says that ring_pop_front will
honor any packet constraints as long as these hold before it is called.
TheNF developer can provide desired constraints when using libVig;
in this example, the provided constraint (Fig. 2) conveniently serves
as a loop invariant too. §5.1.2 has the details on libVig contracts.
1void ring_pop_front(struct ring* r, struct packet* p)
2/*@ requires ringp(r, ?packet_constraints_fp, ?lst, ?cap) &*&
3 lst != nil &*& packetp(p, _); @*/
4/*@ ensures ringp(r, packet_constraints_fp, tail(lst), cap) &*&
5 packetp(p, head(lst)) &*&
6 true == packet_constraints_fp(head(lst)); @*/
7{
8 //@ extract_first(r);
9 struct packet* src_pkt = r->array + r->begin;
10 p->port = src_pkt->port;
11 r->len = r->len - 1;
12 r->begin = r->begin + 1;
13 if (r->cap <= r->begin) {
14 r->begin = 0;
15 //@ stitch_with_empty_overflow(r);
16 } else {
17 //@ stitch_with_empty(r);
18 }
19}
Figure 3: Excerpt from the implementation of
ring_pop_front() and its formal contract.
Step 2: Exhaustive symbolic execution. (a) Vigor replaces all
function calls that access state or interact with the network with
calls to a symbolic model. For example, the symbolic model for
ring_pop_front (model (a) in Fig. 4) returns a packet with fully
symbolic content (i.e., a packet whose content could be anything
whatsoever) constrained via packet_constraints to have its target
1We use the terms “data structure” and “data type” interchangeably, with the under-
standing that the data structure state is encapsulated behind a well-defined interface.
2This implementation is only an illustrative example. In a our verified NAT, and in
most real implementations, we would not copy packets field by field (Fig. 3, l.10) but
rather return a pointer to the packet.
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port different from 9. Despite its simplicity, this model captures all
the behavior of ring_pop_front that matters in our context, namely
that it never yields a packet with target port 9. (b) Once all func-
tion calls have been replaced with calls to symbolic models, Vigor
symbolically executes the resulting code. Even though Vigor is sym-
bolically executing real C code, this step terminates quite quickly,
because the models are stateless and with few branching points
(like the one in Fig. 4), and the loop annotations help prevent un-
necessary unrolling. This exhaustive symbolic execution has two
outcomes, both assuming the symbolicmodel is valid: First, it proves
that the target low-level property (i.e., that the NF cannot crash for
any input) holds. Second, it produces all the feasible function-call
sequences that could result from running the code, along with the
constraints on program state that hold after each call. Fig. 5 shows
one such call sequence that results when the ring is full. For details
on exhaustive symbolic execution, see §5.2.1.
Model (a)
1void ring_pop_front(struct ring* r, struct packet* p) {
2 FILL_SYMBOLIC(p, sizeof(struct packet), "popped_packet");
3 ASSUME(packet_constraints(p));
4}
Model (b)
1void ring_pop_front(struct ring* r, struct packet* p) {
2 FILL_SYMBOLIC(p, sizeof(struct packet), "popped_packet");
3 // No constraint on the packet's target port.
4}
Model (c)
1void ring_pop_front(struct ring* r, struct packet* p) {
2 p->port = 0;
3}
Figure 4: Symbolic models of ring_pop_front.
Step 3: Lazy model validation. (a) For each function call that
accesses state, in each feasible call sequence, Vigor verifies that the
symbolic model used to produce the speculative verification via
symbolic execution in Step 2 was, in retrospect, valid for that call.
This validity means that the output of the model is a superset (in the
sense of constrained symbolic state) of the output that the actual
implementation could produce. For example, consider the call to
ring_pop_front (Fig. 5, l.13): Vigor extracts the constraints on sym-
bolic program state that held right after the model was symbolically
executed in Step 2; inserts, right after the call, an assertion for these
so-called path constraints (l.16); and asks a proof checker to verify
that this assertion is compatible with ring_pop_front’s contract
(details in §5.2.3). The proof checker concludes that it is, and in
particular that the output of the model (a packet whose target port
can be anything but 9) is a superset of the output specified by the
function’s contract, hence also of the function’s implementation
(since Step 1 proved that the implementation satisfies the contract).
(b) Vigor verifies that, after every packet send(), not shown in Fig. 5,
the target semantic property holds, i.e., the output packet does not
have target port 9. More details appear in §5.2.2.
Invalid models. An invalid model will cause either Step 2 or
Step 3 to fail, but it will never lead to an incorrect proof. For example,
1struct ring* arg1;
2struct packet arg2;
3
4loop_invariant_produce(&(arg1));
5//@ open loop_invariant(_);
6bool ret1 = ring_full(arg1);
7//@ assume(ret1 == true);
8bool ret2 = ring_empty(arg1);
9//@ assume(ret2 == false);
10bool ret3 = can_send();
11//@ assume(ret3 == true);
12//@ close packetp(&(arg2), packet((&(arg2))->port));
13ring_pop_front(arg1, &(arg2));
14//@ open packetp(&(arg2), _);
15
16//@ assert(arg2.port != 9);
Figure 5: Example function-call sequence that results from
Step 2, annotated by Vigor with an assertion of a path con-
straint (l.16).
model (b) in Fig. 4 is too abstract for our purpose: it returns a
packet whose content could be anything at all, including having a
target port 9. This is an “over-approximate” model in verification
speak. If Vigor uses this model in Step 2, then Step 3b fails: since
the model can return packets with target port 9, Vigor cannot
verify for all call sequences that the output packet does not have
target port 9. Conversely, model (c) in Fig. 4 is too specific for our
purpose: it always returns a packet with target port 0, i.e., it is
an “under-approximate” model. If Vigor uses this model in Step
2, then Step 3a fails: Recall that, for each call, Vigor obtains the
path constraints that held right after the model was symbolically
executed in Step 2, and inserts, right after the call, an assertion
for these path constraints. With this model, the assertion would
be //@ assert(arg2.port == 0). The proof checker cannot confirm
that this assertion is always true, because ring_pop_front’s contract
(Fig. 3, ll.4–6) specifies a wider range for arg2.port than 0.
This section illustrated how Vigor stitches symbolic execution
with proof verification via the function-call sequences. There are a
couple other steps involved in the proof (omitted here for clarity)
that we describe fully in §5.
4 PROVEN PROPERTIES
We verified our NAT (which we call VigNAT) using the approach
outlined in §3. We now describe the specific properties we verify.
4.1 Semantic Properties
We proved that VigNAT correctly implements the semantics spec-
ified in the Traditional NAT RFC [53]. For this, we wrote a NAT
specification that formalizes our interpretation of the RFC, and
which we believe to be consistent with typical NAT implementa-
tions. The specification [58] has 300 lines of separation logic [51]
and took 3 person-days to complete.
We started from formally describing NAT behavior as shown in
Fig. 6, in terms of the effect that a packet arrival has on abstract
state (flow_table). There are three static configuration parameters:
the capacity of the flow table (CAP), the flow timeout (Texp), and the
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1Packet P arrives at time t → P is accepted
2 → expire_flows(t)
3 → update_flow(P, t)
4 → forward(P)
5
6expire_flows(t) := ∀G ∈ flow_table
7 s.t. G.timestamp +Texp <= t :
8 remove G from flow_table
9
10update_flow(P, t) := if (F (P ) ∈ flow_table) {
11 ∀G ∈ flow_table s.t. F (P ) = G :
12 set G.timestamp = t
13 } else {
14 if (P .iface = internal) {
15 if (size(flow_table) < CAP) {
16 insert F (P ) in flow_table
17 }
18 }
19 }
20forward(P) := if (F (P ) ∈ flow_table) {
21 if (P .iface = internal) {
22 → S.data = P .data
23 → S.iface = external
24 → S.dst_ip = P .dst_ip
25 → S.dst_port = P .dst_port
26 → S.src_ip = EXT_IP
27 → S.src_port = F(P).ext_port
28 → send packet S
29 } else {
30 → S.data = P .data
31 → S.iface = internal
32 → S.dst_ip = F(P).int_ip
33 → S.dst_port = F(P).int_port
34 → S.src_ip = P .src_ip
35 → S.src_port = P .src_port
36 → send packet S
37 }
38 } else {
39 drop packet P
40 }
Figure 6: A conceptual summary of the formal specification
of the NAT semantic properties (based on RFC 3022).
IP address of the external interface (EXT_IP). The F (P) function ex-
tracts from the flow table the packet flow ID, based on its source and
destination IP addresses and ports. With every packet arrival (l.1),
the NAT finds and removes expired flows (l.2), updates the flow
table according to the received packet (l.3), then potentially rewrites
the packet and forwards it (l.4). To update the flow table, the NAT
finds all entries with the same flow ID as the received packet and
updates their timestamps (ll.10–12); if there are no matching entries
(l.13), and if the packet arrived at the internal interface (l.14), and
if the flow table is not full (l.15), then the NAT adds a new entry
in the flow table (l.16). If, at this point, there exists an entry in the
flow table with the packet’s flow ID (l.20), then the NAT forwards
the packet, modifying its headers depending on whether the packet
arrived at the internal or external interface; otherwise, it drops the
packet (l.39).
We wrote a formal machine-readable specification of NAT se-
mantics, organized along similar lines. It merges expire_flows,
update_flow, and forward into a single decision tree. The tree con-
sists of branches over the conditions shown in Fig. 6 (pre-conditions),
such as P .iface = internal, and assertions that check the correspond-
ing output (post-conditions), such as “packet P is dropped” or
“S.dst_ip equals P .dst_ip.” Both pre- and post-conditions are writ-
ten in separation logic, formulated as predicates on abstract NAT
state and/or incoming/outgoing packets. The decision tree covers
both branches of each pre-condition, so it provides a complete spec-
ification of how the NAT behaves under every circumstance. We
formally verify that the C implementation of VigNAT implements
the behavior in this formal specification derived from Fig. 6.
Finally, since VigNATmaintains its state in libVig data structures,
we also prove that it uses these data structures correctly (§5.2.4),
i.e., that the data structures’ pre-conditions are satisfied.
4.2 Low-Level Properties
Besides NAT semantics, we also prove that VigNAT is free of the fol-
lowing undesired behaviors: buffer over/underflow, invalid pointer
dereferences, misaligned pointers, out-of-bounds array indexing,
accessing memory that is not owned by the accessor, use after free,
double free, type conversions that would overflow the destination,
division by zero, problematic bit shifts, and integer over/underflow.
Proving these properties boils down to proving that a set of as-
sertions introduced in the VigNAT code—either by default in the
KLEE symbolic execution engine [9] or using the LLVM undefined
behavior sanitizers [42, 43, 57]—always hold.
5 DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we describe the design of VigNAT and howwe verify
its properties, as well as a few implementation-related highlights.
Full details and source code are available at [58].
While the goal of the work presented in this paper is specifically
to build a formally verified NAT, our broader goal is to find a prac-
tical way to verify any stateful NF, so we took a more principled
approach than strictly necessary. In our view, practicality consists
of the simultaneous achievement of two design goals: competitive
performance and low verification effort. The latter has three com-
ponents: writing the code in a way that can be verified, writing
the proof, and verifying the proof. Vigor supports C, and thus does
not impose an undue burden on writing the NF code, so we focus
on devising a technique for productively writing and verifying a
realistic NF.
Well-known verification approaches that are relevant to this task
include whole-program theorem proving (e.g., seL4 [34]) or per-
path/per-state techniques like symbolic execution [19, 55]. With
the former, verifying a property proof is relatively fast, but writing
the proof is a slow, often manual job. With the latter, verifying
a property in a real NF can take long, even forever, due to path
explosion [19, 55], but is easy to automate. To verify a stateful NF,
neither approach seems practical on its own.
In our approach, we decompose the proof into parts, and prove
each part with whichever technique is suited for that part; after that,
we stitch the proofs together. We posit that most NFs consist of one
part that is common across many NFs (thus making it worthwhile
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P1
P3
P2
P4
P5
   VigNAT satisfies semantic 
properties (Validator + Proof Checker)
     VigNAT satisfies
low-level properties 
(Symb Exec Engine)
       VigNAT stateless code uses 
libVig according to libVig's interface 
contracts (Validator + Proof Checker)
      libVig model is faithful to  
the libVig interface contracts 
(Validator + Proof Checker)
    libVig implementation 
behaves according to the libVig 
contracts (Proof Checker)
Figure 7: Structure of the VigNAT correctness proof. Pi (X ) ←
Pj symbolizes that the proof of property Pi is done by X un-
der the assumption that Pj holds.
to invest manual effort in proving its correctness) and another
part that is different in each NF (and thus its verification should
be automatic). We also posit that, over time, NFs will converge to
using a stable, common set of data types to encapsulate NF state,
and the difference between NFs will result primarily from how their
stateless code employs these data types. For VigNAT, we put all
NF state in data structures that reside in a library, and use human-
assisted theorem proving to verify the correctness of this library.
We then use symbolic execution to prove the correctness of the
stateless code.
The challenge is how to stitch together the results of the two
verification techniques. We developed lazy proofs, a way to auto-
matically interface symbolic execution to a proof checker based on
separation logic. We built a Validator that implements this tech-
nique and glues sub-proofs together into the final proof that VigNAT
implements the NAT RFC [53].
The VigNAT proof consists of five sub-proofs, shown in Fig. 7.
The top-level proof objective P1 is to show that VigNAT exhibits
correct NAT semantics. The proof of P1 assumes three things: First,
the code must work properly in a basic sense, such as not crashing
and having no overflows (P2). Second, the implementations of the
library data structures must work as specified in their interface
contracts (P3)—e.g., looking up a just-added flow should return that
flow. Third, the stateless part of the NF must use the data structures
in a way that is consistent with their interfaces (P4)—e.g., a pointer
to the flow table is never mistakenly passed in as a pointer to a flow
entry. Assuming P2 ∧ P3 ∧ P4, the Validator produces a proof of P1
that is mechanically verified by the proof checker.
These three assumptions must of course be proven. To prove
P2—that VigNAT satisfies low-level properties—Vigor symbolically
executes the stateless code and checks that the properties hold
along each execution path. For this to scale, we employ abstract
symbolic models of the library data structures. Therefore, the proof
of P2 must assume that these models are correct (P5), that the data
structure implementations satisfy their interfaces (P3), and that
the stateless code correctly uses the stateful data structures (P4). If
any of these three assumptions were missing, the proof would not
work3. To prove P3, we employ relatively straightforward (but still
tedious) theorem proving to show that the library implementation
satisfies the contracts that define its interface.
It is in the proof of P4 and P5 that we find a second scalability
benefit of the lazy proofs technique: Not only does it allow us to
stitch together proofs done with different tools (thereby allowing
us to employ for each sub-proof whichever tool offers the optimal
benefit-to-effort ratio) but also makes it possible to get away with
proving weaker properties. For example, instead of proving that
P5 is universally true and then using this proof to further prove
P2, we first prove P2 assuming P5, and afterward only prove that
P5 holds for the specific way in which the proof of P2 relies on P5.
This use-case-specific proof of P5 is easier than proving P5 for all
possible use cases.
We now describe Vigor’s data structure library and its correct-
ness proof (§5.1), our “lazy proofs” technique and its use for proving
the correctness of VigNAT’s semantics (§5.2), and conclude with
a summary of the Vigor workflow (§5.3) and of the assumptions
underlying our approach (§5.4).
5.1 A Library of Verified NF Data Types
VigNAT consists of stateless application logic that manipulates state
stored in data structures, like hash tables and arrays, provided by
the Vigor library (libVig). For example, in §3, we placed incoming
packets into a ring data structure from libVig. Generally speaking,
stateless NF code should be free of any dynamically allocated state
and complex data structures. It can retain basic program state, such
as statically allocated scalar variables as well as structs of scalars.
Dealing with explicit state in the verification of imperative, non-
typesafe programs is hard, mainly due to the difficulty of tracking
memory ownership and type information, as well as disentangling
pointer aliases. For example, the question of which memory a void*
pointer could ever reference is often undecidable. Functional, type-
safe languages (Haskell, ML, etc.) are appealing for verification,
but to us it was paramount to both support C (preliminary evi-
dence [60] suggests C to be widely popular among NF developers)
and enable verification of a fully stateful NF. We accomplish both
by encapsulating NF state behind libVig’s interface and adopting a
disciplined use of pointers. While this approach is not compatible
with all software, we believe it is a good match for NFs.
Besides data types for NFs, libVig also provides a formal interface
specification that defines the behavior of these data types, along
with a proof that the libVig implementation obeys the specification.
To enable symbolic execution of stateless NF code, libVig also pro-
vides symbolic models of its data types. We verify libVig once, and
the proof carries over to any NF that uses the library.
This subsection details the libVig implementation (§5.1.1), de-
scribes our use of abstraction and contracts to formally specify
libVig’s semantics (§5.1.2), shows how we prove that the implemen-
tation satisfies its interface specification (§5.1.3), and presents the
symbolic models of libVig’s data structures (§5.1.4) to be used by a
symbolic execution engine.
3It may seem strange that assumptions P3 and P4 are needed both for the proof of
low-level properties and that of semantic properties, but this is because “satisfying
interface contracts” relates both to high-level interface semantics and to basics like
proper data encapsulation.
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5.1.1 libVig implementation. Competitive performance is an
important design goal, and libVig is a good place to optimize for
performance. A key design decision we made is to preallocate all
of libVig’s memory. While this lacks the flexibility of dynamically
allocating at runtime, it offers control over memory layout, mak-
ing it possible to control cache placement and save the run-time
memory management overhead. The cost of preallocation is neg-
ligible (e.g., VigNAT’s peak resident set size is 27 MB during our
experiments), and we believe preallocation is fully compatible with
how real NFs use state. In terms of verification with Vigor’s proof
checker, static allocation does not offer noticeable benefits over
dynamic allocation, but may do so for other checkers.
As of this writing, libVig provides several basic data structures
that we needed to develop VigNAT: a flow table, implemented as a
double-keyed hash map, a network flow abstraction, a ring buffer,
an expirator abstraction for tracking and expiring flows, a batcher
for grouping homogeneous items, a port allocator to keep track of
allocated ports, and a classic hash table, array, and vector. libVig
also provides an nf_time abstraction for accessing system time and
a dpdk layer on top of the DPDK framework.
5.1.2 Using abstraction and contracts to formally specify libVig
semantics. We specify the semantics of libVig data types in terms
of abstract state that the data types’ methods operate on. This is
the same approach we took in formalizing the NAT RFC (§4.1).
The pre-conditions and post-conditions for each method form the
contracts that define what each data type is supposed to do.
Fig. 8 shows a snippet of a get method for the libVig flow table.
The pre-condition is on lines 3-6 and the post-condition on lines 7-
14. The contracts are meant for the Validator’s and proof checker’s
consumption, but they can also serve as documentation, when
ambiguous natural language or reading source code fall short.
Each requires pre-condition states the requirements for the func-
tion to run: a relationship between its arguments and the abstract
state, or amemory ownership token for a pointer. Each ensures post-
condition specifies what holds after the completion of the method:
a relationship between the arguments and the return value, the up-
dated value at a certain memory location, or a memory ownership
token.
We adopt a “sanitary” policy on the use of pointers: stateless
code can pass/receive pointers across the libVig interface, but the
libVig data structure remains opaque to the caller. Stateless code
can copy pointers, assign them, compare them for equality, but not
dereference them. Vigor automatically checks that stateless code
obeys this discipline (§5.2.4).
5.1.3 Verifying libVig correctness (P3). Once the formalization
of the interface is complete, we write the proof, i.e., we annotate
the code with assertions, loop invariants, etc. and define lemmas
for the intermediate steps of the proof.
The proof checker starts by assuming the pre-condition (ll.3-6)
and steps through every code statement while developing its set of
assumptions. When it encounters a branch condition, it explores
both branches. Inlined annotations (lines 16-18, 20-22, 24, 28-30)
help the checker along the way to understand the transformations
of abstract state, and it verifies that they indeed correspond to
the transformations of concrete machine state. On memory ac-
cesses (l.19), the proof checker checks the validity of the address
1int dmap_get_by_first_key /*@ <K1,K2,V> @*/
2 (struct DoubleMap* map, void* key, int* index)
3/*@ requires dmappingp<K1,K2,V>(map, ?kp1, ?kp2, ?hsh1, ?hsh2,
4 ?fvp, ?bvp, ?rof, ?vsz,
5 ?vk1, ?vk2, ?rp1, ?rp2, ?m)
6 &*& kp1(key, ?k1) &*& *index |-> ?i; @*/
7/*@ ensures dmappingp<K1,K2,V>(map, kp1, kp2, hsh1, hsh2,
8 fvp, bvp, rof, vsz,
9 vk1, vk2, rp1, rp2, m) &*&
10 kp1(key, k1) &*& (dmap_has_k1_fp(m, k1) ?
11 (result == 1 &*& *index |-> ?ind &*&
12 ind == dmap_get_k1_fp(m, k1) &*&
13 true == rp1(k1, ind)) :
14 (result == 0 &*& *index |-> i)); @*/
15{
16 /*@ open dmappingp(map, kp1, kp2, hsh1, hsh2,
17 fvp, bvp, rof, vsz,
18 vk1, vk2, rp1, rp2, m); @*/
19 map_key_hash *hsh_a = map->hsh_a;
20 //@ map_key_hash *hsh_b = map->hsh_b;
21 //@ assert [?x]is_map_key_hash(hsh_b, kp2, hsh2);
22 //@ close [x]hide_map_key_hash(map->hsh_b, kp2, hsh2);
23 int hash = hsh_a(key);
24 //@ open [x]hide_map_key_hash(map->hsh_b, kp2, hsh2);
25 int res = map_get(map->bbs_a, map->kps_a, map->khs_a,
26 map->inds_a, key, map->eq_a,
27 hash, index, map->keys_capacity);
28 /*@ close dmappingp(map, kp1, kp2, hsh1, hsh2,
29 fvp, bvp, rof, vsz,
30 vk1, vk2, rp1, rp2, m); @*/
31 return res;
32}
Figure 8: Top-level get method in the libVig flow table data
type. index is an output parameter for the index of the en-
try whose first key matches key. The method returns 1 if the
entry is found, 0 otherwise.
and the memory ownership token. On method calls (l.23), it checks
the pre-condition of the called method and then assumes its post-
condition, in essence replacing the call with an assumption of the
callee’s post-condition (it verifies separately that the post-condition
indeed holds whenever the callee returns). When reaching a return
point (l.31), the proof checker checks the post-condition.
Implementation: In Vigor, we use the VeriFast proof checker [28],
which works for C programs annotated with pre-conditions and
post-conditions written in separation logic [51]. Annotating code
is not an easy task, especially for non-experts. However, separation
logic is relatively friendly: It is an extension of classic Hoare logic
designed for low-level imperative programs that use sharedmutable
data structures. It has a good notion of memory ownership, which
makes it easy to express transfer of ownership through pointers.
Separation logic supports local reasoning [44], in that specifications
and proofs of a method refer only to the memory used by that
method, not the entire global state.
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libVig contains 2.2 KLOC of C, 4K lines of pre- and post-conditions
and accompanying definitions, and 21.8K lines of proof code (in-
lined annotations). The human effort of writing the proof is about
2 person-months. VeriFast verifies the proof in less than 1 minute.
5.1.4 Symbolic models for libVig data types. Symbolic execu-
tion [6, 9, 14, 27, 33, 50] is the method we use for verifying VigNAT’s
low-level properties (P2) in §5.2.1. This approach entails having a
symbolic execution engine execute the NF with symbolic rather
than concrete values. A symbolic value represents simultaneously
multiple possible values (e.g., an unconstrained symbolic packet
header represents all possible packet headers). Assignment state-
ments are functions of their symbolic arguments, while conditional
statements split execution into two paths, each with symbolic state
correspondingly constrained by the branch condition.
When symbolically executing the VigNAT stateless code, which
calls into libVig, we do not wish to also symbolically execute the
libVig implementation, because that would lead to path explosion.
Therefore, we abstract libVig with a symbolic model that simulates
the effect of calling into libVig and keeps track of the side effects
in a per-execution-path manner. The symbolic model differs from
the formal contracts in two ways: it is executable code, and it may
be imperfect—it might miss some possible behaviors of the libVig
implementation, or exhibit behaviors that could never occur.
As we discuss in the next section, writing a good symbolic model
is hard, and our lazy proof technique helps deal with this challenge:
it tolerates imperfections in a symbolic model while at the same
time formally guaranteeing that accepted imperfections do not
affect the overall proof of the NF.
5.2 Lazy Proofs
Our proposed lazy proofs technique glues together a symbolic ex-
ecution engine (SEE) with a proof checker to produce proofs of
NF properties that were previously out of reach. Together with the
stateful/stateless separation described earlier, this constitutes the
cornerstone of how we verify VigNAT.
The main idea is to use an SEE to enumerate all execution paths
through the stateless NF code, and (a) record for each path a sym-
bolic trace of how the stateless code interacted with the outside
world and with libVig; and (b) verify that P2 (low-level properties)
holds on each path. The Validator then transforms the symbolic
traces (i.e., a representation of all possible observable behaviors of
VigNAT’s stateless code) into mechanically checkable proofs that
P4, P5, and ultimately P1 (NAT semantics) hold.
Not only do lazy proofs allow us to use the right tool for each
desired property but they also resolve the modeling challenge: writ-
ing a symbolic model of libVig requires reconciling two conflicting
objectives. On the one hand, the model must remove enough details,
i.e., be abstract enough to make symbolic execution terminate in
useful time—after all, it is abstraction that reduces the number of
paths to explore symbolically. On the other hand, the model must
be detailed enough to capture enough libVig behaviors to be faithful
to the libVig implementation in the context of the properties being
verified. How good the model is depends directly on which details
are relevant to the proof vs. not, which in turn depends both on
the properties to be proven and on the code that uses the model.
Thus, devising a good model is often an iterative process that con-
verges after multiple attempts onto a good model customized to
the code and the property to be proven. Spending time proving the
faithfulness (P5) of draft models before actually knowing that they
are fit for proving P2 would be wasteful. With lazy proofs, we can
now first attempt the proof of P2 assuming the model is OK and,
if the model indeed helps prove the desired property, only then
invest in validating the model (P5). From a practical standpoint, this
approach makes it cheap to write models, because we don’t need to
spend time ironing out the very last bugs; instead we rely on Vigor
to surface these bugs over time.
Said differently, lazy proofs exploit the fact that an application
typically uses only a subset of the semantics offered by its libraries.
So, instead of proving that the libVig model accurately captures all
of libVig’s semantics, we only prove that it does so for the semantics
used by VigNAT.
We now describe the proof of P2—low-level properties (§5.2.1),
the Vigor Validator and how it uses symbolic traces to prove P1—
correctness of VigNAT’s semantics (§5.2.2), and finally how the
Validator proves correctness of the libVig symbolic model (§5.2.3)
and correctness of how libVig is used by the stateless code (§5.2.4).
5.2.1 Proving that VigNAT satisfies low-level properties. Low-
level coding mistakes, like the misuse of memory, can cause a pro-
gram to crash or behave erratically, so proving the absence of such
mistakes is essential to proving higher level semantic properties.
As described in §4.2, the desired low-level properties refer to the ab-
sence of bugs such as buffer over/underflow, out-of-bounds memory
accesses, double free, arithmetic over/underflow, and others.
To prove the absence of such bugs, Vigor performs exhaustive
symbolic execution (ESE), using an SEE to enumerate all execution
paths through the stateless part of the NF. The SEE explores all
feasible branches at conditional statements, therefore ESE is fully
precise: it enumerates only feasible paths, i.e., paths for which
there exists a set of inputs that takes the program down that path,
and does not miss any feasible paths. Low-level properties are
stated as asserts, and for each feasible execution path the SEE
reasons symbolically about whether there exists an input that could
violate the assert. In order to make this approach feasible, Vigor
first replaces all calls to libVig with calls to the libVig model; this
abstracts away all state handling code, thereby removing almost all
constructs that lead to path explosion, such as loosely constrained
symbolic pointers. Next, we make the SEE aware of loop bounds
by marking the loop guard of an infinite loop with VIGOR_LOOP and
providing loop invariants, so that the SEE can transform the loops
to avoid unnecessary loop unrolling (e.g., by havocing [1]). This
eliminates the last source of path explosion in VigNAT.
If the assert for each low-level property holds on every feasible
path during ESE, then we have a proof that that stateless code is
free of low-level bugs, since ESE reasons about all possible inputs
without enumerating those inputs. The formal proof that libVig
behaves according to its interface contracts (§5.1.3) guarantees that
libVig too is free of low-level bugs, otherwise its proof would not
verify. This means that all VigNAT code satisfies the low-level
properties. If this was not stateless code but a stateful program, ESE
would likely not complete. Yet, in our case, the SEE checks all 108
paths through VigNAT’s stateless code in less than 1 minute.
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Of course, the proof makes certain basic assumptions, like com-
piler correctness (more in §5.4), and most importantly it assumes
that the libVig model is correct (P5) and the stateless code uses
VigNAT data structures correctly (P4). Verifying these assumptions
a posteriori requires a Validator and symbolic traces, which we
describe in the next subsection.
Implementation. In Vigor we use the KLEE SEE [9]. It checks
out-of-the-box several low-level properties, and we add the checks
from LLVM’s undefined behavior sanitizers [42, 43, 57]. We modi-
fied KLEE in several ways: First, we added loop invariant support,
and we enabled KLEE to automatically find the variables that may
change inside a loop and havoc [1] them. The NF developer still
has to manually insert the assertions and assumptions for the loop
invariants, but KLEE can now use them to avoid enumerating un-
necessary paths. Second, we added dynamic pointer access control
by providing primitives that allow libVig developers to enable/dis-
able dereferenceability of a pointer between libVig calls. Third, we
added the ability to record symbolic traces, described next.
5.2.2 Proving that VigNAT satisfies NAT RFC semantics. We
think of the formalized NAT semantics as “trace properties”: given
a trace of the interaction between an NF and the outside world,
what must hold true of the trace for it to have been generated by
a correct NAT NF? More specifically, the NAT properties (shown
in §4.1 and Fig. 6) are in the form of pre- and post-conditions for
actions triggered by the arrival of a packet. The pre-conditions, ex-
pressed on the abstract NAT state plus the incoming packet, select
which action applies. The corresponding post-condition states what
must hold of the abstract state and the potential outgoing packet
after the action is completed.
In order to verify that the desired properties hold, Vigor collects
from the SEE a trace of each explored execution path. This trace
summarizes how the VigNAT code interacted, during symbolic
execution, with (a model of) the outside world, be it the libVig
library or the DPDK framework. Since the traces have common
prefixes, they form a tree—the NF’s execution tree. In the context of
this section, a symbolic trace is a path from the root of the execution
tree to a node in the tree, be it an internal or a leaf node. In other
words, the set of symbolic traces considered by Vigor consists of
all execution path traces and all their prefixes.
Each trace has two parts: a sequence of calls that were made
across the traced interface, and a set of constraints on symbolic
program state. Fig. 9 shows a simple example of a trace for the code
in Fig. 1 using the ring data structure. The seven calls in this trace
result from the execution of lines 8→9→12→13→14→16 in Fig. 1.
loop_invariant_produce and loop_invariant_consume are markers
indicating the beginning and the end of a loop iteration. In the
ring_pop_front call, packet is an output parameter pointing to the
popped packet; the trace records its initial and final value.
The constraints section shows the relationship between the dif-
ferent symbols. In this simple example there is only one constraint:
y , 9 is the result of the application of packet_constraints (Fig. 2)
in the ring model. The initial value x is unconstrained.
The Validator now takes each trace, weaves into it the properties
to be proven, and turns it into a verification task. This is a C pro-
gram that contains the sequence of calls from the trace, enriched
with metadata on the symbolic variables used as arguments and
1loop_invariant_produce(ring=[..]) ==> []
2ring_full(ring=[..]) ==> true
3ring_empty(ring=[..]) ==> false
4can_send() ==> true
5ring_pop_front(ring=[..],
6 packet={.port=:x:} --> {.port=:y:}) ==> []
7send(packet={.port=:y:}) ==> []
8loop_invariant_consume(ring=[..]) ==> []
9--- constraints ---
10:y: != 9
Figure 9: Symbolic trace for a path through the code in Fig. 1.
Colons (:val:) designate a symbol, --> separates the input
and output value of a pointer argument, ==> marks the re-
turn value of a function call, [..] indicates omitted details.
return values, as well as the constraints that describe the relation-
ships between these symbolic variables at each point in the trace.
The Validator also inserts lemmas into the trace, to help the proof
checker. In essence, the Validator translates each symbolic trace
into a proof that the trace satisfies the desired properties. It then
passes the proof to the proof checker to verify it.
Fig. 10 shows the Validator-transformed version of Fig. 9. The
seven calls are now on lines 6, 8, 10, 12, 15, 18, and 22. The uninitial-
ized arg1 and arg2 variables are unconstrained symbols initially. The
constraints on return values recorded in Fig. 9 turn into the @assume
statements on lines 9,11, and 13. The symbolic constraint from l.10
in Fig. 9 turns into the @assume on l.17 of the proof. These four
@assume statements constitute the pre-condition of this symbolic
trace. In order to set up the post-condition that needs to be verified,
the Validator initializes special handle variables packet_is_sent and
sent_packet on lines 19 and 20 to capture externally visible effects
immediately after the send() call. Then it inserts the NF specifica-
tion (semantic property) into the trace on ll. 24-26:
1if (packet_is_sent) {
2 assert(sent_packet->port != 9);
3}
Vigor verifies that the NF spec holds after every loop iteration.
Once the proof checker completes all verification tasks received
from the Validator, we have a proof that the trace properties weaved
in by the Validator hold for all possible executions of the stateless
code. Vigor proves that VigNAT satisfies the NAT specification by
weaving the properties of §4.1 into the symbolic traces, similarly
to ll. 24-26 in Fig. 10. Trace verification is highly parallelizable:
to verify all 431 traces resulting from the 108 execution paths of
stateless VigNAT takes 38 minutes on a single core and 11 minutes
on a 4-core machine. As will be noted later, this verification time
includes not only proving P1 but also P4 and P5.
5.2.3 Validating the libVig symbolic model. We say a symbolic
model is valid if the behavior it exhibits is indistinguishable from
the behavior of the libVig implementation captured by the formal
interface contracts4. Any behaviors of the model that are not ob-
served during ESE are irrelevant to its validity for this particular
4It is sufficient to show that the model over-approximates the contracts, because any
proof that holds for the over-approximation holds for an exact model as well.
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1struct ring* arg1;
2struct packet arg2;
3bool packet_is_sent = false;
4struct packet* sent_packet = NULL;
5
6loop_invariant_produce(&arg1);
7//@ open loop_invariant(&arg1);
8bool ret1 = ring_full(arg1);
9//@ assume(ret1 == true);
10bool ret2 = ring_empty(arg1);
11//@ assume(ret2 == false);
12bool ret3 = can_send();
13//@ assume(ret3 == true);
14//@ close packetp(&arg2, packet(arg2.port));
15ring_pop_front(arg1, &arg2);
16//@ openpacketp(&arg2, _);
17//@ assume(arg2.port != 9);
18send(&arg2);
19packet_is_sent = true;
20sent_packet = &arg2;
21//@ close loop_invariant(&arg1);
22loop_invariant_consume(&arg1);
23
24/*@ if (packet_is_sent) {
25 assert(sent_packet->port != 9);
26} @*/
Figure 10: The trace of Fig. 9, translated into a proof.
proof. This is the insight behind our lazy proof technique: it doesn’t
matter whether a model is universally valid, but rather what mat-
ters is whether the parts of the model used during symbolic execution
are valid—this is a much weaker property than universal validity,
but is sufficient for our purposes. The symbolic traces capture all
necessary information on how the model is used.
The technique for proving that the libVig model is consistent
with the libVig interface contracts is similar to the one we use
for proving NAT semantics. Only this time, instead of weaving
the NAT pre- and post-conditions into the traces, the Validator
weaves in the assertions for the given trace’s path constraint. It then
asks the proof checker to verify whether the assertions hold based
solely on the post-conditions of the libVig functions. If verification
succeeds, then it means that, after each invocation of the libVig
model, the outcome covers all possible outcomes prescribed by the
libVig interface contracts.
A libVig model can be over-approximate, under-approximate, or
both. The question that the Validator aims to answer is whether, for
the particular NF and properties, the model is sufficiently accurate.
If a model is “too under-approximate” for the desired proof, it will
cause the validation phase to fail, because its narrow behavior
does not cover the spectrum of behaviors allowed by the contracts.
If it is “too over-approximate” for the target proof, it will either
cause exhaustive symbolic execution (ESE) or validation to fail—the
former if the model exhibits behavior that is too general and makes
it impossible to verify the low-level properties, the latter if low-
level properties verify but a loop invariant or a high level semantic
property is violated. When ESE completes, we have proof that the
low-level properties hold, as long as the model is valid. ESE failure
means that either there is a violation of a low-level property or the
model offered by libVig is not suitable—Vigor does its best to help
the developer distinguish between the two, but there is still room
for improvement. In either case, it’s back to the drawing board:
either the NF developer needs to fix her bug, or the Vigor developer
needs to alter the model.
Vigor also uses a model we wrote of the DPDK packet processing
framework’s send, receive, and free calls. We do not formally vali-
date this model, though there is no fundamental reason it cannot
be done. We make it part of Vigor’s trusted computing base (§5.4).
5.2.4 Proving that VigNAT correctly uses libVig. There is one
caveat to the proof in the previous section: if a libVig method imple-
mentation is invoked and the corresponding pre-condition does not
hold, then the behavior of that method is undefined. For example,
passing a null argument when the contract says it must be non-
null could cause the implementation to crash, behave incorrectly,
or behave correctly. It is therefore imperative that, in conjunction
with validating the model’s behavior, Vigor also validate the caller’s
behavior with respect to the interface contracts.
The method for proving that the VigNAT stateless code uses
the libVig data structures consistently with the libVig interface
contracts is the same as above, except that the Validator weaves in
the pre-conditions contained in the libVig interface contracts. In
fact, the Validator weaves in the NAT pre- and post-conditions and
the libVig pre- and post-conditions in one go, and generates a single
verification task per trace that simultaneously verifies properties
P1, P4, and P5.
The trickiest part in verifying the libVig pre-conditions is track-
ing memory ownership across the interface. A pointer returned
by a libVig method (either as a return value or via an output pa-
rameter) references memory owned at first by libVig; upon return,
ownership transfers to the caller. After using/modifying the pointer,
the NF code calls another function to return ownership to libVig.
A pointer passed as an argument to a libVig method may be the
address of a libVig data structure (equivalent to the this pointer
in C++/Java or the self reference in Python). This type of pointer
remains opaque to the stateless code: it can be copied, assigned, and
compared for equality, but cannot be dereferenced. The Validator
and proof checker need not look at the memory pointed to by
such pointers but only keep track of aliasing information. The
pointed-to memory is owned by libVig at all time. Vigor verifies
that the stateless code obeys this pointer discipline during symbolic
execution, using our addition to the SEE for enabling/disabling
dereferenceability of a pointer between libVig calls.
A pointer used as an output parameter points to where the caller
expects libVig’s return result to be written. In this case, the pointed-
to memory is owned by the calling code. The Validator and proof
checker trace the evolution of the pointed-to memory by including
it in the function’s input set before the call and in the function’s
output set after the call. A special case of output pointer is a double
pointer to a library data structure (e.g., X** p) as appears in the data
structure allocation functions. The VigNAT code owns the pointee
*p, so the Validator tracks it, but the pointee of the pointee **p is a
library data structure, thus the memory is owned by the library, so
there is no need to track it. Vigor currently does not support other
cases of double or deeper pointers.
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Vigor also checks for memory leaks. Even though stateless code
cannot dynamically allocate memory, leaks are possible if it uses
libVig incorrectly, such as forgetting to call a release method. Un-
like simple low-level properties (e.g., integer overflow) that can be
stated as a simple assert, absence of memory leaks is a global prop-
erty. Vigor therefore must keep track of memory ownership and
validate that ownership is properly returned to libVig before the
end of the execution. This facility, for example, caught an accidental
memory leak in VigNAT where we failed to release DPDK memory
corresponding to a packet returned by DPDK, thus violating the
DPDK interface contracts.
5.3 The Vigor Workflow
The Vigor workflow described above can be summarized as fol-
lows: We split the NAT NF into a stateless and a stateful part, the
latter contained in the libVig library. Then we use formal theo-
rem proving to verify P3—correctness of the data structures im-
plemented in libVig. We use exhaustive symbolic execution (ESE)
with a modified version of KLEE [9] to explore all paths in the
stateless part (using symbolic models of the data structures) and
verify P2—low-level properties, like crash freedom, memory safety,
and no overflows—as well as VigNAT’s disciplined use of pointers.
This step proceeds under the assumptions that the stateless code
uses the libVig data types according to their interface contracts (P4)
and the libVig model is faithful to the libVig interface contracts (P5)
for the particular execution paths explored during ESE. Both of
these assumptions we prove a posteriori using a combination of
our Vigor Validator and the VeriFast proof checker [28]. Finally, we
use this same combination of tools to prove VigNAT’s semantic
properties (P1), i.e., that it conforms to our formalization of RFC
3022 [53]. P1 ∧ P2 ∧ P3 ∧ P4 ∧ P5 together formally prove VigNAT’s
correctness, under the assumptions described in the next section.
5.4 Assumptions
The trusted computing base for a Vigor-verified NF consists of the
Vigor toolchain (the Clang LLVM compiler, VeriFast, KLEE, and our
own Validator) and the environment in which the NF runs (DPDK,
device drivers, OS kernel, BIOS, and hardware). We assume that
the compiler implements the same language semantics employed
by Vigor (e.g., same byte length for C primitive types). We wrote
symbolic models for three DPDK functions and for system time,
which as of this writing we have not verified. They are small (about
400 LOC), so we convinced ourselves manually that they are correct
over-approximations. One could envision adopting an environment
that has a formal specification, like seL4 [34], in which it becomes
possible to prove the validity of these models.
6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Having shown in previous sections how we verify VigNAT’s cor-
rectness, we now demonstrate that this formal verification does not
come at the cost of performance: compared to an unverified NAT
written on top of DPDK, our verified NAT offers similar latency
and less than 10% throughput penalty. We focus our evaluation on
comparing VigNAT (labeled Verified NAT in the graphs) to three
other NFs:
(a) No-op forwarding is implemented on top of DPDK; it re-
ceives traffic on one port and forwards it out another port without
any other processing. It serves as a baseline that shows the best
throughput and latency that a DPDK NF can achieve in our experi-
mental environment.
(b) Unverified NAT is also implemented on top of DPDK; it im-
plements the same RFC as VigNAT and supports the same number
of flows (65,535), but uses the hash table that comes with the DPDK
distribution. It was written by an experienced software developer
with little verification expertise, different from the one who wrote
and verified VigNAT. It serves to compare VigNAT to a NAT that
was not written with verification in mind.
(c) Linux NAT is NetFilter [5], set up with straightforward mas-
querade rules and tuned for performance [29]. We expect it to be
significantly slower than the other two, because it does not benefit
from DPDK’s optimized packet reception and transmission. We
use it to make the point that VigNAT performs significantly bet-
ter than the typical NAT currently used in Linux-based home and
small-enterprise routers, as one would expect from a DPDK NAT.
We use the testbed shown in Fig. 11 as suggested by RFC 2544 [7].
The Tester and the Middlebox machines are identical, with an Intel
Xeon E5-2667 v2 processor at 3.30 GHz, 32 GB of DRAM, and
82599ES 10 Gbps DPDK-compatible NICs. The Middlebox machine
runs one of the four NFs mentioned above (we use one core). The
Tester machine runs MoonGen [22] to generate traffic and measure
packet loss, throughput, and latency; for the latency measurements,
we rely on hardware timestamps for better accuracy [49]. We use
DPDK v.16.07 on Ubuntu Linux with kernel 3.13.0-119-generic.
Figure 11: Testbed topology for performance evaluation.
First, we measure the latency experienced by packets between
the Tester’s outbound and inbound interfaces. We first run a set of
experiments in which all the NATs are configured to expire flows
after 2 seconds of inactivity. In each experiment, the Tester gener-
ates 10–64,000 “background flows,” which produce in total 100,000
pps and never expire throughout the experiment, and 1,000 “probe
flows,” which produce 0.47 pps and expire after every packet. We
use the background flows to control the occupancy of the flow
table, while we measure the latency of the packets that belong to
probe flows. We focus on the probe flows because, from a perfor-
mance point of view, they are the worst-case scenario for a NAT
NF: each of their packets causes the NAT to search its flow table
for a matching flow ID, not find any match, and create a new entry.
Fig. 12 shows the average latency experienced by the probe flows
as a function of the number of background flows, for the three DPDK
NFs: the Verified NAT (5.13µsec) has 2% higher latency than the
Unverified NAT (5.03µsec), and 8% higher than No-op forward-
ing (4.75µsec). So, on top of the latency due to packet reception and
transmission, the Unverified and Verified NAT add, respectively,
0.28µsec and 0.38µsec of NAT-specific packet processing. For all
three NFs, latency remains stable as flow-table occupancy grows,
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which shows that the two NATs use good hash functions to spread
the load uniformly across their tables. The only case where latency
increases (to 5.3µsec) is for the Verified NAT, when the flow table
becomes almost completely full (the green line curves upward at
the last data point). The Linux NAT has significantly higher latency
(20µsec).
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Figure 12: Average latency for probe flows. Confidence inter-
vals are approximately 20 nanosec, not visible at this scale.
To give a sense of latency variability, Fig. 13 shows the comple-
mentary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of the latency
experienced by the probe flows, when there are 60,000 background
flows (i.e., 92% occupancy): the Verified NAT has a slightly heavier
tail than the Unverified NAT; all three NFs have outliers that are two
orders of magnitude above the average, but these are due to DPDK
packet processing, not NAT-specific processing (the three curves
coincide for latency exceeding 6.5µsec). The CCDFs computed for
different numbers of background flows look similar.
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Figure 13: Latency CCDF for probe flows.
We get similar results in a second set of experiments, where
the Tester produces the same flow mix as before, but the NATs
are configured to expire flows after 60 seconds of inactivity (hence
neither the probe flows nor the background flows ever expire).
In this case, the average latency of the Verified NAT is slightly
lower (5.07µsec), while that of the Unverified NAT the same as
before (5.03µsec).
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Figure 14: Maximum throughput with a maximum loss rate
of 0.1%.
Finally, we measure the highest throughput achieved by each NF.
In each experiment, the Tester generates a fixed number of flows
that never expire, each producing 64-byte packets at a fixed rate, and
wemeasure throughput and packet loss. During all experiments, the
Middlebox is CPU bound. Fig. 14 shows the maximum throughput
achieved by each NF with less than 0.1% packet loss, as a function
of the number of generated flows. The Verified NAT (1.8 Mpps)
has 10% lower throughput than the Unverified NAT (2 Mpps). This
difference in throughput comes from the difference in NAT-specific
processing latency (0.38µsec vs. 0.28µsec) imposed by the twoNATs:
in our experimental setup, this latency difference cannot be masked,
as each NF runs on a single core and processes one packet at a time.
The Linux NAT achieves significantly lower throughput (0.6Mpps).
In essence, these results indicate that the performance of the
libVig flow table (which has a formal specification and proof) is
close to that of the DPDK hash table (which has neither), though
not the same. The implementations of the two data structures are
quite different. We did not try to reuse/adapt the implementation
of the DPDK hash table, because it resolves hash conflicts through
separate chaining—items that hash to the same array position are
added to the same linked list—a behavior that is hard to specify in
a formal contract. Instead, the libVig flow table resolves conflicts
through open addressing: if an item hashes to an occupied array
position, it is stored in the next array position that is free, together
with auxiliary metadata that speeds up lookup. We have not yet
optimized our implementation at the instruction level, so it has an
overall slower access time because there are, on average, more can-
didate memory locations for each item5; the difference is greatest
for lookups that find no match, because these result in searching
all candidate memory locations.
In summary, our experimental evaluation shows that it is possi-
ble to have a NAT network function that both offers competitive
performance and is formally verified.
7 DISCUSSION
Developing and verifying VigNAT is a first step toward the broader
goal of verified, high-performance NFs. The Vigor approach and
prototype have several limitations, and also offer opportunities for
future research. In this section, we describe some of these.
5This is the case for the particular implementations used, respectively, by the Unverified
and Verified NAT, not for separate chaining and open addressing in general.
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Vigor will not produce an incorrect proof, but it may fail to prove
a property that actually holds for a given NF, because of an invalid
model. For example, in §3, if Vigor uses model (b) from Fig. 4, it
cannot prove that the given NF correctly implements the discard
protocol—even though that is the case—because the model is too
abstract. So, if a proof fails, and the reported reason for the failure
does not lead the NF developer to a bug in their code, it may be
that the given NF exercises libVig functionality that is not properly
captured by a symbolic model; in this case, the NF developer can
request from the libVig developers a more detailed model.
The current version of Vigor cannot verify concurrent code.
We expect that the biggest challenge will be the development and
verification of useful concurrent data structures.
We do not have yet experience with applying Vigor to mature,
legacy code. Such software often has state handling code sprinkled
throughout, so refactoring it to put all state in libVig data structures
could be challenging. It would also require annotating loops and
extracting loop invariants, but we expect to be able to automate
these tasks using known techniques [23, 47].
More generally, we hope to reduce the human effort needed to
expand libVig and use Vigor by automating most tasks: (a) Many
lemmas needed for Step 3 are boiler-plate, and we should be able to
generate them automatically. (b) For proving low-level properties,
it may be enough to use simple over-approximate models that leave
outputs unconstrained, and such models can be generated automat-
ically. We can also leverage techniques that learn invariants from
traces [13, 45] to refine symbolic models or produce initial drafts for
libVig contracts. (c) Much of the effort in verifying libVig goes into
writing intermediate lemmas in order to bridge logical leaps that
VeriFast cannot make on its own. Using a proof assistant or a more
powerful theorem prover would reduce this effort [4, 12]. (d) Gen-
erating formal contracts that specify standards (e.g., as described in
an RFC) will always require manual effort; however, standards often
have structure that is amenable to natural language processing, so
we could, perhaps, employ automated techniques [37] to generate
first drafts, which can then be refined by humans.
8 RELATEDWORK
As described in §2, our work on VigNAT falls in the area of NF
verification, under the broader umbrella of “data-plane verification.”
The closest work to ours is that of Dobrescu et al. [19], which
verified NFs written in Click [35], including a NAT. They proved the
low-level properties of crash freedom and bounded execution for
these NFs. Their approach relies on exhaustive symbolic execution
of individual Click elements and on-demand composition of the
resulting analyses to reason about Click pipelines. Like Vigor, their
approach puts all state in special data structures, however, it does
not verify the data structures themselves nor that the NF uses
them correctly. It is for this reason that Dobrescu et al.’s work
cannot prove semantic properties—the step forward that enables
such proofs is the “lazy proofs” technique we described here.
Orthogonally to NF verification is what we refer to as network
verification: verify network properties (reachability, loops, etc.) of
a combination of modeled network devices. There is a lot of prior
work in this area [24, 25, 30–32, 38, 39, 46, 52, 55, 59].
Stoenescu et al. [55] focus on network verification, but neverthe-
less rely on more detailed NF models than other work in this area,
and they test their models for faithfulness to the corresponding NF
implementations. Vigor also relies on models (not of entire NFs but
of state-accessing functions), but it does not rely on testing to gain
trust in the models’ faithfulness. Instead, Vigor formally verifies
that the models are guaranteed to be valid for the proof, which
means that replacing a model with the corresponding implementa-
tion preserves the proof, modulo the assumptions in §5.4.
Many before us have applied verification techniques to net-
worked and distributed systems.We share tools and techniques with
this work—symbolic execution, formal contracts, proof checkers—
but the approach of using different verification techniques for dif-
ferent parts of the code, and combining the results through lazy
proofs, is novel. Musuvathi et al. [41] tested the Linux TCP im-
plementation for conformance to a formal specification. Bishop et
al. [3] tested several implementations of TCP/IP and the sockets
API for conformance to a formal specification. Kuzniar et al. [36]
tested OpenFlow switches for interoperability with reference im-
plementations. Hawblitzel et al. [26] verified network applications
written in Dafny—a high-level language with built-in verification
support. Beringer et al. [2] verified an OpenSSL implementation,
proving functional correctness and cryptographic properties.
There exists a body of prior work that has made significant
progress in verifying properties of systems software. Much of
this work can be applied to NF verification as well. For example,
seL4 [34], CompCert [54], and FSCQ [11] show how to prove se-
mantic properties of systems. Unfortunately, they all require the
use of high-level (sometimes esoteric) programming languages and
deep expertise in verification, which we consider a high barrier to
adoption. The motivation behind Vigor is to make the verification
of network functions accessible to most (ideally all) NF developers.
9 CONCLUSION
We presented a NAT box along with a technique and toolchain
for proving that it is semantically correct according to a formal
interpretation of RFC 3022. Our main contribution is exploiting the
specifics of NF structure to propose a new verification technique
that stitches together exhaustive symbolic execution with formal
proof checking based on separation logic. This technique, called
“lazy proofs,” can scalably prove both low-level and semantic prop-
erties of our NF. Experimental results demonstrate the practicality
of our approach: the verified NAT box performs as well as an un-
verified DPDK NAT and outperforms the standard Linux NAT. We
hope our technique will eventually generalize to proving properties
of many other software NFs, thereby amortizing the tedious work
that has gone into building a library of verified NF data structures.
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